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LEGAL AND NEUROSCIENTIFIC 
PERSPECTIVES ON  
CHRONIC PAIN 
 
DAVID SEMINOWICZ, AMANDA PUSTILNIK, AND STEPHEN RIGG 
 
SPEAKERS: THE HON. ANDRE DAVIS,* KAREN D. DAVIS,** AND HANK 
GREELY*** 
 
I.     INTRODUCTION 
 
In the first panel, the Honorable Andre Davis (“Judge Davis”), along 
with Professors Hank Greely and Karen Davis (“Professor Davis”), 
discussed various topics relating to chronic pain.1 The focus of this panel 
concerned how chronic pain is medically interpreted and received, as well 
as how the legal system deals with the issues created by chronic pain.  
The panel tackled several questions regarding chronic pain, one of 
which was whether the law is equipped to handle chronic pain related 
cases.2 The panel began with the definitions of pain and chronic pain, 
descriptions of the types of pain that might be seen clinically and in a 
courtroom, and raised the issue of whether chronic pain should be 
conceptualized as a disease.3 The discussion then moved to how 
 
Copyright © 2015 by Amanda Pustilnik.  
* Judge Davis serves on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and is a 
member of the MacArthur Foundation Research Network for Law and Neuroscience. 
** Professor Davis is a professor in the Department of Surgery and Institute of Medical Science at 
the University of Toronto, and is also the head of the Division of Brain, Imaging and Behaviour-
Systems Neuroscience at the Toronto Western Research Institute. 
*** Professor Greely is a professor at Stanford University, and is the director of the Center of Law 
and Biosciences. 
 1. Hon. Andre Davis, Karen D. Davis, & Hank Greely, Imaging the Brain, Changing Minds: 
Chronic Pain Neuroimaging and the Law Symposium, Panel 1: Legal and Neuroscientific 
Perspectives on Chronic Pain (Apr. 25, 2014) [hereinafter Panel 1] (transcript on file with the 
editors). 
 2. Id. at 2. 
 3. Id. at 5–11. 
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neuroimaging studies have transformed our understanding of acute and 
chronic pain, noting our abilities to understand chronic pain mechanisms 
and describing the goal to eventually develop an objective measure of pain.4 
Next, the panel discussed why chronic pain based claims are both 
important and challenging to the legal system, and how the legal system 
currently deals with such claims.5 The first issue raised was that incentives 
distort behavior.6 For example, the risks of exaggeration and fraud can arise 
when a party and his or her attorney have “skin in the game.” Legal 
decision makers’ fear of fraud can have a distorting effect too, leading to 
excess suspicion toward claimants with pain disorders. The panel also 
discussed various factors that affect pain related cases.7 In particular, 
chronic pain related claims arise most often in the administrative law 
setting, pursuant to Social Security Disability Insurance or workers’ 
compensation insurance regimes, but can also arise in tort, ERISA, and 
others.8 
Then the panel discussed how the advances in neuroimaging science 
might (or might not) assist in adjudicating pain questions in various legal 
settings.9 The panel discussed whether science has come far enough to find 
correlations between certain brain activity and chronic pain, and the validity 
and reliability of such correlations and probative evidence.10 The panel 
highlighted the “reverse inference problem” in interpreting brain scans; that 
is, a particular scan pattern may correlate with a particular mental state, like 
the state of being in pain, but many different mental states could produce 
similar looking brain patterns.11 This reverse inference problem is one facet 
 
 4. Id. at 11–13. 
 5. Id. at 13–15. 
 6. See id. at 16–17 (indicating that Davis, J. and Prof. Karen Davis discussed how the 
contingent fee arrangement could drive lawyers to push clients to seek more in damages, and how 
America’s healthcare system could induce more chronic pain sufferers to sue). 
 7. See id. at 17–18 (stating that Davis, J. and Prof. Hank Greely discussed how neuroscience, 
neuroimaging, and in some cases, even secret surveillance can be factors in determining chronic 
pain cases). 
 8. See id. at 6–8 (reporting that Prof. Hank Greely discussed the different kinds of chronic 
pain legal claims and the various laws giving rise to those claims); see also, e.g., Report of the 
Commission on the Evaluation of Pain, 50 SSA SOC. SECURITY BULL. 13, 14–15 (1987), available 
at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v50n1/v50n1p13.pdf (noting that since the early 1980s, an 
increasing number of SSA cases have challenged the Social Security Administration’s policy on 
the evaluation of pain).   
 9. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 18–19. 
 10. Id. at 21–22. 
 11. Id. at 22–24; see also Reverse Inference: Neuroscience’s Greatest Fallacy?, KNOWING 
NEURONS (Feb. 12, 2014), http://knowingneurons.com/2014/02/12/reverse-inference-
neurosciences-greatest-fallacy (explaining reverse inference as an epidemic of backwards 
reasoning in which an observed brain activity is correlated to cognitive processes that are not 
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of the broader issue that brain scans are not self interpreting and have no 
self evident meaning, unlike, for example, an x-ray of a broken bone. The 
panel further discussed the similarities and differences between 
neuroimaging evidence and some types of scientific evidence and visual 
courtroom techniques that have become commonplace in the courtroom.12 
Bringing the session to an end, the panelists and participants discussed 
the future of neuroimaging in the courtroom and the types of research that 
might be necessary to use neuroimaging as proof of pain.13 Overall, the 
panel ended on a cautiously optimistic note of taking pain neuroimaging 
evidence to the courtroom. 
 
II.     WHAT IS CHRONIC PAIN? 
 
In order for scientists and legal actors to begin a meaningful dialogue 
on pain and the law, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of how 
each field views chronic pain. 
 
A.     Definitions 
 
Pain, as defined by the International Association for the Study of Pain 
(“IASP”), is “[a]n unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated 
with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such 
damage.”14 The IASP further declares that pain is always subjective and 
can be experienced in the absence of a physical stimulus.15 
The generally accepted definition of chronic pain is pain that persists 
for an extended period of time (typically greater than three months), or 
persisting beyond the normal time of healing for a particular injury.16 There 
is no single definition of chronic pain, however, that captures all pain 
conditions, owing to the many possible sources and manifestations of these 
disorders. For example, in neuropathic pain (such as with carpal tunnel 
syndrome), pain arises as a direct consequence of “a lesion or disease 
 
actually tested, but rather linked through research implicating a particular brain area with a 
particular cognitive process). 
 12. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 25–26. 
 13. Id. at 26–27. 
 14. IASP Taxonomy, INT'L ASS’N FOR STUDY OF PAIN (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.iasp-
pain.org/Education/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=1698#Peripheralneuropathicpain. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Chronic Pain: Symptoms, Diagnosis, & Treatment, NAT'L INST. HEALTH 
MEDLINEPLUS, Spring 2011, at 5, 5–6, available at 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/magazine/issues/spring11/articles/spring11pg5-6.html 
(defining chronic pain as pain that persists for longer than 12 weeks). 
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[affecting] the somatosensory nervous system,”17 whereas inflammatory 
pain (such as with rheumatoid arthritis) is a type of pain that arises from 
activation of nociceptors (neurons that are responsive to noxious stimuli).18 
A third type of chronic pain disorder is sometimes referred to as functional 
pain disorders, which typically includes irritable bowel syndrome, chronic 
low back pain, and fibromyalgia, among others, and is characterized by pain 
in the absence of a clear physical cause and is often associated with anxiety 
and mood disturbance.19 Note that as the mechanisms of a pain disorder are 
uncovered through research, classification of the disorder might change. 
 
B.     Pain Classifications 
 
Whether a chronic pain disorder falls into the neuropathic, 
inflammatory, or functional category, hypersensitivity (sometimes called 
allodynia or hyperalgesia)20 via peripheral and central sensitization is 
usually present.21 At the brain level, the long-term consequences of either 
type of pain might affect sensory, cognitive, and emotional circuits.22 These 
brain changes can be detected with neuroimaging methods, and in 
 
 17. IASP Taxonomy, supra note 14. 
 18. See Types of Pain, DEP’T PAIN MED. & PALLIATIVE CARE, 
http://www.stoppain.org/pcd/content/addiction/nociceptive.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 2015) (stating 
that rheumatoid arthritis is a type of inflammatory pain caused by the activation of pain receptors 
on the surface level of the body). 
 19. See Fânia Cristina Santos et al., Síndrome de amplificação dolorosa no idoso. Relato de 
caso e revisão da literature [Pain Amplification Syndrome in the Elderly. Case Report and 
Literature Review] 13 Rev DOR. SÃU PAULO 175, 177 (2012) (Spain), available at 
http://www.scielo.br/pdf/rdor/v13n2/en_15.pdf (stating that functional pain syndromes include 
chronic pain, where the symptoms may have no organic cause at all). 
 20. Joel Greenspan, Adam Kolber, & Michael Pardo, Imaging the Brain, Changing Minds: 
Chronic Pain Neuroimaging and the Law Symposium, Panel 2: “’Excess’ Pain, Hyperalgesia, and 
the Variability of Subjective Experience” 8 (Apr. 25, 2014) [hereinafter Panel 2] (transcript on file 
with the editors) (explaining that “hyperalgesia” is pain that is produced by stimulation that is 
experienced at a higher pain level than would normally be associated with that stimulation). 
 21. See Jeffery Norris, World of Chronic Pain Suddenly Looks Different to Researchers, 
UNIV. CAL. S.F. (Nov. 16, 2009), http://www.ucsf.edu/news/2009/11/8209/chronic-pain-
hypersensitivity-nerve-pathways-use-vglut3-and-opioid-receptor (stating that chronic pain due to 
hypersensitivity is common); see also Clifford J. Woolf, Pain Hypersensitivity, THE WELLCOME 
TRUST, http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/en/pain/microsite/science4.html (last visited March 5, 2015) 
(stating that two mechanisms involved with hypersensitivity are central sensitization and 
peripheral sensitization). 
 22. See Karen D. Davis & Massieh Moayedi, Central Mechanisms of Pain Revealed Through 
Functional and Structural MRI, 8 J. NEUROIMMUNE PHARMACOLOGY 518, 518 (2013), available 
at 
http://www.pain.anes.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/central%20mechanisms%20of%20pain%20review
.pdf (stating that brain structure is not static and can adapt to prolonged nociceptive input and 
pain, and may often be the cause of chronic pain). 
  
2015] PANEL 1 211 
 
particular, the emphasis in this field has been on functional and structural 
MRIs.23 The most consistent findings across chronic pain disorders 
conclude that patients have decreased gray matter volume and increased 
activation during evoked pain and cognitive and emotional tasks compared 
to the control group.24 While to date, there have been no clear 
demonstrations that these brain changes could be used as objective 
biomarkers for chronic pain, the aggregate findings suggest that pain is a 
disease of the brain,25 and that with recent advances in neuroimaging 
technology and analysis techniques, the possibility of using these scans as 
objective biomarkers is becoming a near reality.26 
 
C.      The Trouble With Pain in Legal Settings 
 
For scientific and medical communities, the rather open-ended 
definitions of pain generally work. Pain is the number one reason that a 
person will seek medical attention.27 For the caregiver, except in a very 
small number of cases, there is no reason to question a patient’s complaint, 
and the caregiver and the patient will work together toward the common 
goal of relieving pain. In the legal system, the opposing goals of the 
claimant and the defense pose problems for conditions that can only be 
subjectively validated. As Professor Greely commented about pain in the 
legal system, “we know that there are people who lie, [and] we know there 
 
 23. See Karen D. Davis & Massieh Moayedi, Central Mechanisms of Pain Revealed Through 
Functional and Structural MRI, 8 J. NEUROIMMUNE PHARMACOLOGY 518, 520 (2013), available 
at 
http://www.pain.anes.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/central%20mechanisms%20of%20pain%20review
.pdf (stating that neuroimaging technologies, specifically functional and structural MRIs, can be 
used to detect brain responses, gray matter volume, functional connectivity, and neuronal activity 
in the brain). 
 24. See id. at 529 (stating that when comparing healthy controls versus patients with chronic 
pain, fMRIs of patients with chronic pain showed heightened emotional responses during periods 
of evoked pain when trying to balance pain and emotionally challenging tasks). 
 25. See David Borsook, Neurological Diseases and Pain, 135 BRAIN 320, 320 (2012), 
available at http://brain.oxfordjournals.org/content/brain/135/2/320.full.pdf (“More recently, 
clinicians and researchers have come to the conclusion that, in many cases, chronic pain is a direct 
result of the neurological disease, or may even be considered an integral part of the underlying 
disease.”).  
 26. See Davis & Moayedi, supra note 23, at 530 (“[K]nowledge gained from fundamental 
neuroimaging studies of pain may provide insight into biomarkers of chronic pain and the optimal 
time to intervene with treatment and also can provide insight into potential side effects of 
treatment . . . .”). Currently, this is limited to predicting acute pain in healthy subjects, but the field 
is advancing in the direction of using the scans of both healthy people and those with chronic pain. 
Id. at 518. 
 27. Pain, NAT’L CTR. FOR COMPLEMENTARY & INTEGRATIVE HEALTH, 
https://nccih.nih.gov/health/pain (last modified Jan. 27, 2015). 
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are people who exaggerate . . . . The legal system needs some kind of 
evidence to help it evaluate whether somebody is in pain, whether they’re 
exaggerating the pain, [or] whether they’re lying about it.”28 This problem 
is not peculiar to pain disorders: as Judge Davis observed, “the law has long 
struggled to satisfy itself that it can do a good job of separating the bogus, 
exaggerated claims from the legitimate claims.”29 But separating legitimate 
from bogus claims may be more difficult (or may be perceived by decision 
makers as more difficult) in cases involving pain because of pain’s nature 
as invisible, subjective, and unquantifiable. 
Thus, the dilemma that the panel faced was what—if anything—could 
the current and near future state of neuroimaging research provide the legal 
system in terms of evidence. In American tort law, the goal is to “quantify, 
identify, legitimize, and compensate people who are suffering from the 
negligence of others.”30 Thus, in most cases where pain and suffering are 
concerned, not only is there a requirement to demonstrate that the pain is 
real, but there is the requirement to show that it was the result of a 
particular incident.31 In most administrative law settings, as in the Social 
Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) regime and in workers’ 
compensation regimes, the problems of causation are absent; the individual 
claiming disability benefits (called “the insured”) must demonstrate that his 
or her pain is real and disabling, regardless of its external causes or internal 
etiology.32 As Professor Davis notes, “nobody—and even people within the 
pain scientific and medical community—can agree whether or not [chronic 
pain is] a disease.”33 
D.      Is Chronic Pain a Disease? 
 
 
 28. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 10. 
 29. Id. at 6. 
 30. Id; see also Stephen J. Shapiro, Overcoming Under-Compensation and Under-Deterrence 
in International Tort Cases: Are Statutory Multiple Damages the Best Remedy?, 62 MERCER L. 
REV. 449, 449 (2011) (stating that the widely recognized purpose of tort law is to compensate the 
parties that are injured by the wrongdoings of others). 
 31. See Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts 
Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981) (stating 
that causation, or the cause and effect relationship of incident to injury, must be established before 
liability can be imposed). 
 32. See Complex Regional Pain Syndrome (CRPS) and Social Security Disability, SOCIAL 
SECURITY DISABILITY HELP, http://www.disability-benefits-help.org/disabling-
conditions/complex-regional-pain-syndrome (last visited Mar. 5, 2015) (stating that the claimant 
must establish a diagnosis of chronic pain and how chronic pain affects the claimant’s daily living 
and work-related performance in order receive social security benefits for a chronic pain injury). 
 33. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 11. 
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In a recent debate, scientists have questioned whether chronic pain is 
best described as a “disease” in its own right. 34 The topic is contentious in 
part because the definition of disease is somewhat ambiguous. Professor 
Davis was in favor of classifying chronic pain as a disease and believed that 
in doing so, it would only be beneficial for patients (as it has been for other 
diseases),35 but stated that others in the field disagreed for various 
reasons.36 A recent paper outlines the potential negative consequences of 
labeling chronic pain as a disease based on neuroimaging studies, which 
included: negative effects on (1) the therapeutic dialogue between clinicians 
and patients; (2) the social dialogue about reimbursement for pain 
treatments and disability due to pain; and (3) the chronic pain research 
agenda.37 Professor Davis’s opinion on pain being classified as a disease in 
terms of the legal outcomes was that “if a judge is told by the medical 
community that this person has a disease, I think that [the lawyer’s] job 
must be easier . . . .”38 
Some have argued that neuroimaging evidence supports the idea that 
chronic pain is a disease of the brain.39 If chronic pain leads to consistent 
alterations in brain structure and activity, then presumably this position 
would hold. Since chronic pain can have multiple causes and diverse 
comorbid clinical manifestations, it is yet unclear whether such a consistent 
pattern would be attainable. 
While the definitions of pain and chronic pain are generally clear to 
the scientific and medical fields, they remain—intentionally—quite open to 
interpretation. The subjective nature of pain means that no two people will 
 
 34. See Mark D. Sullivan et al., What Does it Mean to Call Chronic Pain a Brain Disease, 14 
J. PAIN 317, 318 (2013) (stating that classifying chronic pain as a disease may have negative 
effects on therapeutic and social dialogues, as well as chronic pain research); Karen D. Davis, Is 
Chronic Pain a Disease? Evaluating Pain and Nociception Through Self-Report and 
Neuroimaging, 14 J. PAIN 332, 332 (2013) (noting that political issues should not detract from the 
scientific and medical evidence that suggest chronic pain should be considered a disease). 
 35. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 11. See also Davis, supra note 34, at 332 (suggesting that 
classifying chronic pain as a disease will promote an open dialogue and “improve patient and 
physician attitudes, public understanding and caring, as well as research efforts and funding”). 
Judge Davis noted that labeling substance abuse and alcoholism diseases (in the DSM) was a good 
thing for the law and for society. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 14. 
 36. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 14. See also Davis, supra note 34, at 332 (stating that others 
argue that there is a need for “whole body pathology” and “first-person complaints”); Sullivan et 
al., supra note 34 (arguing that “chronic pain” may fail to attain disease status due to a negative 
effect on the doctor-patient therapeutic dialogue, the social dialogue regarding reimbursement for 
pain treatments, and the chronic pain research agenda). 
 37. Sullivan et al., supra note 34. 
 38. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 15. 
 39. See, e.g., David Borsook et al., The Pain Imaging Revolution: Advancing Pain into the 
21st Century, 16 NEUROSCIENTIST 171, 173 (2010). 
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necessarily share identical pain experiences following a common injury.40 
Not only that, but the recovery from an injury in one person might be rapid 
and complete, with no residual pain, while in another person who suffered 
the same injury, despite having appeared to be healed, the pain would 
persist.41 The potential physiological, psychological, and genetic factors for 
such individual variability are numerous.42 This leaves the legal decision 
makers to evaluate the claimant’s subjective account of pain along with 
various forms of conflicting or corroborating medical evidence, but without 
the possibility of objective proof of the degree of pain or pain related 
disability. How does neuroimaging inform our understanding of why 
chronic pain occurs? 
 
E.      Neuroimaging of Chronic Pain 
 
One of the reasons that neuroimaging is useful in informing our 
understanding of chronic pain is the familiarity that the general public has 
with the field. Many people have seen the popular press descriptions of how 
activity in some brain region is associated with a certain behavior, or more 
recently, how your brain changes with learning, development, or in disease 
states.43  
Professor Davis noted that in general, pain researchers are using 
neuroimaging to discover how chronic pain alters brain function and 
structure.44 Many studies have provided substantial evidence of consistent 
brain functional and structural changes in chronic pain disorders, including 
 
 40. See Tetsuo Koyama et al., The Subjective Experience of Pain: Where Expectations 
Become Reality, 102 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 12950, 12950 (2005) (stating that sensory 
events are highly subjective and vary by the individual). 
 41. See Marieke Jepma et al., The Dynamics of Pain: Evidence for Simultaneous Site-Specific 
Habituation and Site-Nonspecific Sensitization in Thermal Pain, 15 J. PAIN 734, 742–44 (2014) 
(describing how variability in pain outcomes may be attributed to several factors). A good 
example of this is post-thoracotomy chronic pain, which about 50 percent of patients develop. 
Despite it being a common and fairly standardized procedure with little variability in surgical 
healing, there is considerable variability in the pain related outcomes of the surgery. Emine Ozgur 
Bayman & Timothy J. Brennan, Incidence and Severity of Chronic Pain at 3 and 6 Months After 
Thoracotomy: Meta-Analysis, 15 J. PAIN 887, 887 (2014). 
 42. See Luda Diatchenko et al., Idiopathic Pain Disorders–Pathways of Vulnerability, 123 J. 
PAIN 226, 229 (2006) (explaining factors that can be attributed to variation in pain outcomes). 
 43. See Alvaro Pascual-Leone & Margot J. Taylor, A Developmental Framework of Brain and 
Cognition from Infancy to Old Age, 24 BRAIN TOPOGRAPHY 183, 183 (2011) (explaining how the 
human brain remains malleable, changing throughout life even after childhood development). 
 44. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 4. 
  
2015] PANEL 1 215 
 
functional pain disorders, fibromyalgia, irritable bowel disorder, and 
temporomandibular joint disorder.45  
Perhaps a bigger question is whether we will be able to predict 
someone’s pain with neuroimaging techniques. This work can rely on 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (“fMRI”), but also upon other 
neuroimaging techniques, like Positron Emission Tomography (“PET”) and 
MRI spectroscopy (“MRS”), which provide readouts of neurotransmitter 
binding and chemical systems in the brain and can provide a more “refined 
look at what might be wrong during chronic pain.”46  
 
F.     Limitations of Pain Neuroimaging 
 
There are also important limitations to our understanding of chronic 
pain. Despite the wealth of recent knowledge gains, major questions about 
the mechanisms of chronic pain remain. Professor Davis described the non-
compatibility of two existing theories, each of which have support from 
multiple lines of research: in one theory (the “specificity theory”), 
individual neuronal pathways are specifically tuned to a percept, such as 
pain; the other theory (the “pattern theory”) takes an integrative view, 
which is that there is no single cell or pathway responsible for pain, but 
rather pain is an integration of inputs that lead to cognitive, emotional, and 
sensory responses.47 The field generally accepts some middle ground.48 
Functional neuroimaging research on acute pain has determined that certain 
brain regions are reliably activated by painful stimuli.49 Chronic pain 
research similarly finds differences in structure and function in predictable 
regions of the brain (although with considerably more variability than in 
 
 45. See, e.g., David A. Seminowicz et al., Regional Gray Matter Density Changes in Brains 
of Patients with Irritable Bowel Syndrome, 139 GASTROENTEROLOGY 48, 48–49 (2010) (giving 
examples of consistent structural and functional changes in the brain associated with chronic pain 
disorders). 
 46. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 11–12. See also CAROLYN ASBURY, THE DANA FOUND., BRAIN 
IMAGING TECHNOLOGIES AND THEIR APPLICATIONS IN NEUROSCIENCE 38–43 (2011), 
https://www.legalbluebook.com/R-18-2-1 (describing neuroimaging techniques such as functional 
magnetic resonance imaging, Positron Emission Tomography, and MRI spectroscopy). 
 47. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 12. See also Ronald Melzack & Patrick D. Wall, Pain 
Mechanisms: A New Theory, 150 SCIENCE 971, 971 (1965) (explaining the definitions of 
“specificity theory” and “pattern theory”). 
 48. See Massieh Moayedi & Karen D. Davis, Theories of Pain: From Specificity to Gate 
Control, 109 J NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 5, 10 (2013) (describing how components of several theories 
of the brain and pain are currently used, creating a multidimensional approach). 
 49. See R. Christopher deCharms et al., Control over Brain Activation and Pain Learned by 
Using Real-Time Functional MRI, 102 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 18626, 18626 (2005) 
(reporting on studies regarding brain activity in response to pain). 
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studies of acute pain).50 But in the absence of a coherent theory of the brain 
(specificity theory, pattern theory, or some as-yet-undeveloped theory), the 
full meaning of these findings remains unclear.  
As a second example of how our understanding of brain circuits in 
chronic pain is limited, Professor Davis noted that in a fMRI, the smallest 
unit that one can examine is “comprised of tens of thousands of cells.”51 In 
other words, with non-invasive neuroimaging technology, our measurement 
units (or voxels) represent “a mixed response that integrates everything 
going on in that little chunk of the brain.”52 To date, no brain region, group 
of regions, or network has been found to be specific to pain. Pain is a 
complex experience, having sensory, emotional, and cognitive components, 
and any activation observed in response to pain could be a representation of 
one or a combination of these components. 
The specificity theory vs. pattern theory and the problems with 
interpreting pain neuroimaging data are just two examples of where our 
understanding of brain circuitry involved in chronic pain is limited. There is 
still much active research in this area, and pain will not be understood 
completely in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, significant progress has 
been made in our understanding of pain that could inform the legal system, 
at least imparting the knowledge that chronic pain changes the brain in a 
manner comparable to other recognized neurological and psychiatric 
disorders.53 
 
III.     THE PRICE OF PAIN: WHAT ARE THE MOTIVES FOR CLAIMING PAIN? 
 
One of the biggest differences that the panelists identified between the 
legal and medical systems that deal with pain and pain evidence is that 
participants in the legal system were much more likely to have “skin in the 
game.”54 While it is possible for doctors to have a stake in their 
diagnoses,55 it is much more common for a lawyer (in a contingent fee 
 
 50. See Ulrike Friebel et al., Coordinate-Based Meta-Analysis of Experimentally Induced and 
Chronic Persistent Neuropathic Pain, 58 NEUROIMAGE 1070, 1073–74 (2011) (explaining brain 
function in pain studies). 
 51. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 10 (stating that there is a lack of empirical data to show how pain 
is received at the second- and third-order neurons in the central nervous system). 
 52. Id. at 12. 
 53. See Pascual-Leone & Taylor, supra note 43 (explaining how the pain leads to brain 
changes). 
 54. See Panel 1, supra note 1, at 13 (referring to “skin in the game” as an investment in the 
outcome). 
 55. For example, a doctor who prescribes controlled painkillers to someone who was faking 
the need could possibly face professional discipline, lose her Drug Enforcement Administration 
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arrangement, for example) to have a stake in the outcome of a trial.56 The 
panel concluded that while this could be a good thing, even at the best of 
times, the situation requires monitoring.57 But the party with perhaps the 
most skin in the game is the party making a claim for having pain.58 
Features of legal regimes can themselves have a distorting effect, 
inducing claimants to present themselves as more impaired than they are 
and even, paradoxically, causing claimants to experience greater levels of 
actual disability.59 Professor Davis described how certain legal regimes can 
have a physiologically disabling effect on their intended beneficiaries.60 
She recounted being told by arthritic patients that they were physically 
capable of being productive for a few of hours a day—but that they had to 
avoid being active because their insurers did not offer part time disability 
claims.61 She reported hearing: “If I go out and I try to be a good citizen, try 
to do some things, try to work a bit a couple hours a day, I see people taking 
pictures of me. But by noon, I’ve had it. So I’m sitting now, in my house, 
getting worse, not moving forward, because otherwise they don’t believe 
me.”62 
Judge Davis echoed a similar point, noting that if someone brought 
suit against certain large companies, they “can be pretty sure that, at various 
times over the next eighteen to thirty six months, there will be somebody 
near [them] with a camera, recording.”63 These intrusions can force 
claimants to stagnate their recoveries while they try to move forward with 
their claims, leaving them unable to even try to improve for fear that the 
other side will catch them doing something active, even just once.64 The 
 
license, or even be on the hook criminally. See David W. Feeder, II, When Your Doctor Says, 
"You Have Nothing to Worry About," Don't Be So Sure: The Effect of Fabio v. Bellomo on 
Medical Malpractice Actions in Minnesota, 78 MINN. L. REV. 943, 945–46 (1994) (explaining that 
physicians may be held liable in tort for malpractice when their patients sustain injuries under 
their care in cases like physician failure or omission in diagnosis). 
 56. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 17. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Ronen Avraham, Putting a Price on Pain-and-Suffering Damages: A Critique of the 
Current Approaches and a Preliminary Proposal for Change, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 87, 87 (2006) 
(stating that pain and suffering awards make up 50 percent of total awards). 
 59. See id. at 115 (explaining why plaintiffs may “behave strategically” by exaggerating pain 
to increase medical costs for a larger monetary award). 
 60. See Panel 1, supra note 1, at 19 (describing the negative consequences associated with 
plaintiff surveillance). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 18. 
 64. See William A. Chittenden III et al., Recent Developments in Health Insurance, Life 
Insurance, and Disability Insurance Case Law, 49 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 233, 243–44 
(2013) (giving examples of video surveillance used in disability and injury claims). 
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fear is that a jury (or insurance company) will then assume that the claimant 
is out all the time, being much more active than claimed.65 
 
IV.     WHAT KINDS OF LEGAL CLAIMS RELATING TO CHRONIC PAIN ARE 
MOST COMMON AND SIGNIFICANT? 
 
Professor Greely, Judge Davis, and, from the audience, Judge Nancy 
Gertner, discussed the ways in which claims involving chronic pain come 
before the legal system. Professor Greely first presented a functional 
grouping of claims involving pain.66 He described three general categories 
of pain related claims that may arise in a variety of legal contexts.67 A 
spirited discussion amongst the legal participants ensued, concerning the 
difficulties that claims of each kind pose for legal decision makers.68 Then 
Professor Greely, Judges Davis, and Judge Gertner described the specific 
legal regimes under which claims involving chronic pain arise, and certain 
evidentiary and institutional concerns particular to each setting.69  
 
A.     Three Kinds of Pain Claims and the Issues They Present 
 
The first category that Professor Greely defined involves claims for 
economic loss.70 Such claims take the form of an assertion by the claimant 
who says something like “[because] [t]he pain is so bad . . . there are . . . 
economically rewarding things[] that I cannot do . . . .”71 These claims, 
Professor Greely noted, can be brought in various bodies of law.72 A 
claimant might seek compensation for the loss of ability to work from state 
or federal government disability insurance schemes, from a private insurer 
pursuant to ERISA,73 or in tort if the pain and resulting economic losses 
 
 65. See id. (showing instances where courts allowed video surveillance as a consideration of 
whether or not the plaintiff was disabled); see also Panel 1, supra note 1, at 18 (noting that one 
controversial “gold standard” of determining a plaintiff’s disability is secret surveillance).  
 66. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 7–8. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. at 8–10 (starting a discussion about the problems of evidence issues and 
calculating the value that pain and suffering poses for the legal system). 
 69. Id. at 8–10, 25–26. 
 70. Id. at 7. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. 
 73. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 
Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2012)). 
  
2015] PANEL 1 219 
 
result from alleged negligence.74 He noted that claims for economic loss are 
the most common form used in claims relating to pain.75 
The second category of pain related claims that Professor Greely 
described involves claims for “particular medical services, or rehabilitative 
services, or other services” related to managing the claimant’s pain 
condition.76 Such claims can arise after an insurer has denied coverage for 
such services because it has determined that the claimant does not really 
need these because the person is not “truly in pain,” or because these 
services that are not the sorts of things that are medically accepted as being 
useful based on the claimant’s diagnosis, or because an insurer interprets 
the services to fall outside of the scope of the insured’s’ coverages.77 
Professor Greely commented that cases like these probably “come up a lot,” 
but that it is hard to know; such cases fly “under the radar” because they are 
likely to settle.78 Claims that take this form may arise in several legal 
contexts, including ERISA and civil suits in contracts against private 
insurers.79  
The third category, and, in Professor Greely’s view, perhaps the 
hardest to adjudicate, involves claims for the non-economic damages 
related to pain—that is, compensation for various forms of suffering.80 
Such compensation is for “the pain they suffer every day as a result of the 
injury” and its non-economic impact on their lives.81 Many losses related to 
chronic pain, particularly if the pain is severe, are real but hard to quantify: 
these losses relate to what it means to experience the self or to live a fully 
realized life.82 Chronic pain changes cognition and mood, meaning that a 
person in chronic pain inhabits a somewhat different self and mind than he 
or she did prior to the pain condition.83 Pain limits life activities, curtailing 
 
 74. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 1, 7. 
 75. Id. at 7. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See, e.g., id. (explaining that in the United States, many people receive health coverage 
through their employees, and that relationship is governed by ERISA). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See generally Sandra H. Johnson, Knox Todd, & Benjamin W. Moulton, Chronic Pain 
and Health Communities: Legal, Ethical, and Policy Issues in Improving the Public’s Health, 31 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS (SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT) 4, 70 (2007) (noting that the effects of chronic pain 
include work incapacity, increase in consumption of health care resources, the diminished chance 
of a healthy lifestyle due to the inability to do physical exercise, and the increased risk of 
depression). 
 83. Sigrid Fry-Revere & Elizabeth K. Do, Chronic Problem: Pain Management of Non-
Cancer Pain in America, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 193 (2013) (explaining that pain creates 
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opportunities to engage in meaningful experiences.84 Severe chronic pain 
(and its medication regime) could be incompatible with pregnancy and 
child rearing, excelling in one’s career, travel, or with taking a walk on a 
beautiful day. Such damages for the claimant’s suffering (sometimes also 
termed “hedonic” losses)85 are “different from the fact that they’re not 
going to be able to work . . . . So how do we evaluate that?”86 This category 
of claims for damages arises only in tort, as disability insurance regimes do 
not provide additional compensation for such real but inchoate losses.87 
Judge Davis commented on the difficulty in evaluating this third 
category of pain related claims and losses, recalling a case he presided over 
when he was sitting on the state court in Baltimore.88 The case involved a 
tort claim brought by an older man with early stage Parkinson’s disease 
who fell and injured himself as a result of the defendant’s negligence.89 The 
Judge recalled that the plaintiff and his wife were “lovely” and 
sympathetic.90 The jury issued a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor along with a 
very large damages award, and the defendant moved to reduce the 
damages.91 Sufficient evidence supported the verdict but not the size of the 
damages award, so the Judge “had to reduce the award in this case.”92 This 
is an example, he said, of where “the law does permit a judge, after the jury 
has made a decision to quantify pain and suffering, to reduce that award,” 
via a “‘remittitur’ of the amount of damages.”93  
The problem, Judge Davis explained, is “[h]ow do I, as a judge, do the 
remittitur? If I’m absolutely convinced that the jury has been too generous 
and acted arbitrarily or on the basis of improper factors in making an award, 
 
debilitating effects that erode an individual’s quality of life with physical and emotional 
consequences). 
 84. Johnson, Todd, & Moulton, supra note 82. 
 85. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 417 (8th ed. 2007) (“Damages that attempt to 
compensate for the loss of the pleasure of being alive.”); see also Hedonic Damages Law & Legal 
Definition, USLEGAL.COM, http://definitions.uslegal.com/h/hedonic-damages/ (last visited Mar. 8, 
2015) (noting that there is no objective measurement for the value of human life). 
 86. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 7. 
 87. See id. (noting that the Social Security Disability Act (“SSDA”) did not permit claims 
based on pain until 1984, and that the SSDA still limits claims based on pain if and only if it is the 
symptom of some objective medical condition the claimant can point to). 
 88. Id. at 9. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. Remittitur is “[a]n order awarding a new trial, or a damages amount lower than that 
awarded by the jury, and requiring the plaintiff to choose between those alternatives[; or] . . . The 
process by which a court requires either that the case be retried, or that the damages awarded by 
the jury be reduced.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 85, at 1321. 
  
2015] PANEL 1 221 
 
how am I, as a judge, [supposed] to recalibrate that? Because frankly, [I 
may be] no better than a jury in doing so.”94 He suggested that the judges 
tend to ask themselves, “‘what’s fair?’ [W]hatever that means.” The second 
question a judge might ask him or herself is a more pragmatic one about 
how much can be awarded versus what is “[left] on the table . . . that ‘sweet 
spot’ [where] everybody is unhappy, but it’ll stand up on appeal.”95 
The pragmatic and institutional considerations that Judge Davis 
identifies here will no doubt remain regardless of future techniques for 
evaluating pain and suffering. He also noted, “the law may be a long way 
from getting the kind of help from science for these kinds of problems.”96 
But, he said, “hope springs eternal”97 that improved understandings of the 
reality of chronic pain and of its specific effects on people suffering from 
such conditions will help jurors and judges to come to more informed and 
specific valuations of the appropriate damages in any particular case.98 
Better information could help judges and jurors move beyond factors like 
likeability (or lack thereof), as well as inform their gut sense of “what’s 
fair?”99 
Building on Judge Davis’ comments, Professor Greely noted an 
additional difficulty in valuing these kinds of cases: a jury (or, in some 
cases, a judge) must put a value on the claim at one point in time—the time 
of the verdict.100 Yet the claimant may change greatly over time, for better 
or for worse, which can lead to the one time award being excessively high 





 94. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 9. Judge Morris Hoffman expressed a similar sentiment on Panel 
2. See Panel 2, supra note 20, at 11 (“[Judges] suffer this problem of getting deadened to the 
process.”). This may reflect accurate self-assessment or judicial modesty. It would be interesting 
to gather data on how judges and jurors, respectively, evaluate pain and suffering damages based 
on the same evidence. 
 95. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 9. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Natalie Salmanowitz, The Case for Pain Neuroimaging in the Courtroom: Lessons from 
Deception Detection, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 139, 144–45 (2015), available at 
http://jlb.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/1/139.full.pdf+html (arguing for the use of fMRI to detect 
the validity of pain in tort cases).  
 100. See Panel 1, supra note 1, at 10 (noting the difficulty that courts have in determining 
whether the claimant is really feeling pain based on the claimant’s self report). 
 101. See id. (emphasizing that self assessments are dangerous because it is difficult to know if 
and how much a complainant may be exaggerating and changing their self assessments). 
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B.     The Legal Regimes or Contexts in Which These Kinds of Claims Arise 
 
Pain related claims that fall into the three categories mentioned above 
arise in various legal contexts. Professor Greely remarked that such claims 
“come up in tort suits at the state and federal level, . . . come up enormously 
in administrative procedures for disability payment—the Social Security 
Administration has literally hundreds of thousands of these—and they’ll 
come up in other occasional, strange contexts, like [when] seeking medical 
benefits.”102 Whether “a pain claim is being made in a court proceeding or 
an administrative proceeding can make a huge difference in terms of what 
evidence can get in and how it gets weighted, and what sorts of processes it 
goes through.”103 Professor Greely also cautioned that it is easy to 
overemphasize what happens during adjudication of a claim.104 Instead, we 
must keep in mind that “90 plus percent of cases get resolved” through 
settlement.105 In these cases, judges or juries’ thoughts of pain disorders, or 
the issue of what neuroimaging [information] could perhaps be admitted 
(subject to Daubert)106 does not become an explicit issue. Instead, the 
majority of resolutions in such cases consist of “bargaining in the shadow 
of the law.”107 
 
1.     State and federal tort claims 
 
In a tort claim in a state or federal court, “the scientific evidence gets 
examined, at least in theory, very closely.”108 Judge Davis and Professor 
 
 102. Id. at 7. 
 103. Id. at 8. 
 104. Id. (noting that the adjudication of these claims are rare as many settle before trial). 
 105. Id.; see also James Herby, Pre-trial Settlement Percentage: Statistics on Personal Injury 
Settlements, THE LAW DICTIONARY, http://thelawdictionary.org/article/pre-trial-settlement-
percentage-statistics-on-personal-injury-settlements/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2015) (noting that 90 
percent of personal injury cases are settled pretrial).  
 106. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The Supreme Court, 
interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence governing the admissibility of expert evidence, held 
that the trial judge should independently evaluate the expert evidence based on factors that include 
whether or not it is the product of scientific methodology (particularly whether the technique or 
theory is falsifiable), whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication, has a known or 
potential error rate, and the degree to which the theory or technique is generally accepted in the 
relevant expert community. Id. at 594 (interpreting FED. R. EVID. 702). Not all states have adopted 
this standard. See MARTIN S. KAUFMAN, ATL. LEGAL FOUND., THE STATUS OF DAUBERT IN 
STATE COURTS 1–3 (2006), http://www.atlanticlegal.org/daubertreport.pdf (noting that 13 states 
and D.C. have rejected the standard, and 7 states have neither accepted nor rejected the standard). 
 107. See Panel 1, supra note 1, at 8. 
 108. See id. at 7 (explaining that the evidence must go through the judge, which is then again 
examined by the jury). 
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Greely both described the Daubert standard for the admissibility of 
scientific or other expert evidence, which applies in federal courts and the 
majority of state courts.109 Under both Daubert and the Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702, the judge is tasked with acting as a “gatekeeper” to 
determine whether the proffered expert evidence is sufficiently reliable and 
whether it will be helpful to the jury.110 Jurors are then supposed to 
carefully evaluate admitted evidence in light of the judge’s instructions, 
which is a task that may be a great deal to ask of any juror.111 
Judge Gertner expressed further skepticism about the expectations that 
Daubert imposes on jurors, and explained particular reservations she had 
about the impact of the adversary process on pain based claims.112 She 
described her experience as a district judge, which made her “less sanguine” 
about the ability of jurors to interpret sophisticated expert evidence.113 
Often, she remarked, it comes down to the level of the parties’ resources.114 
Daubert and the Federal Rules provide “a very flawed, flexible standard, 
and then we bury everything by giving it to a jury, and the jury doesn’t 
necessarily give a reason [for their decision].”115 Further, the adversary 
process creates an “atmosphere of skepticism.”116 Yet, she noted that the 
“law is already so skeptical about pain and suffering. So how is that going 
to play out? And what I fear is that you’re going to have cases that will over 
weigh it, and cases that will under weigh it.”117 
 
2.     ERISA 
 
Cases may also come into federal court pursuant to the Employment 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), which governs the 
relationship between employees and employer provided benefits such as 
 
 109. Id. at 5–7. 
 110. See id. at 7–8; see also Cassandra H. Welch, Flexible Standards, Deferential Review: 
Daubert’s Legacy of Confusion, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1085, 1090 (2006) (discussing the 
effect of Rule 702 and Daubert on the judge’s role as gatekeeper in assisting the jury as the jury 
deciphers scientific and other types of knowledge). 
 111. Id. at 10. 
 112. Id. at 25. For a detailed discussion of the evidentiary process and considerations relating 
to neuroscientific evidence, see Panel 2, supra note 20 at 12–13. 
 113. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 25.  
 114. Id. 
 115. Id.; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 595–96 (1993) (discussing 
how the jury is charged with determining the validity of what scientific evidence is believable). 
 116. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 25. 
 117. Id. at 25–26. 
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health insurance and, in some cases, disability insurance.118 Judge Davis 
noted that just about all people employed in the United States who have 
employer sponsored health plans are covered by ERISA.119 In an ERISA 
action, a claimant may allege that an insurer inappropriately denied 
coverage for needed services or denied a claim for short- or long-term 
disability.120 In these matters, federal courts do not receive evidence (e.g., 
expert witness testimony), but rather review whether the insurance company 
made an appropriate, non-arbitrary decision pursuant to the terms of the 
insurance plan.121 Professor Greely noted that it is “very, very hard for a 
claimant to win an ERISA claim” because of the deferential standard with 
which courts must review a plan’s determination.122 
Judge Davis noted that the court on which he sits, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, recently issued a significant 
opinion in Cosey v. Prudential Insurance Company of America123 that 
concerned ERISA, which involved a “a white collar worker with a senior 
and responsible position . . . who started to have chronic, largely 
unexplained pain” that she alleged disabled her from working.124 The 
worker filed a claim for short term disability that her insurer initially 
approved; the insurer later withdrew its approval.125 Under ERISA, Judge 
Davis noted, “the companies have an awful lot of authority. They actually 
have the authority to say ‘we will decide who is disabled.’”126 In this case, 
the insurer contended that it had discretion to find that the claimant was not 
disabled because she had not come forward with objective evidence of her 
 
 118. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012) (stating that ERISA was intended to govern the relationship 
between employees and employer provided health insurance benefit plans). 
 119. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 6. See also William Pierron & Paul Fronstin, ERISA Pre-
emption: Implications for Health Reform and Coverage, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF, Feb. 2008, at 1, 11, 
available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/ebri_ib_02a-20082.pdf (stating that 82 percent of 
people covered by employment-based health benefits fall under ERISA plans). 
 120. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2012) (stating that a civil action may be brought by a policy holder 
to recover benefits due to them).  
 121. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 115 (2008) (discussing the standard of 
care for insurance plan administrators and the judicial review under ERISA for failing to meet that 
standard.); see also id. at 118 (noting that the Court heard medical testimony gathered and 
supplied by the insurance company rather than testimony from a medical expert). 
 122. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 7; see also Sarah L. Whipple, Piercing ERISA’s Shield of 
Immunity: The First Step—Saving External Review Laws from ERISA Preemption—Rush 
Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran and the Massachusetts Act Relative to Managed Care Practices in 
Insurance Industry, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 863, 896 (2003) (noting the various challenges to a 
successful ERISA claim). 
 123. 735 F.3d 161 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 124. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 19; see also Cosey, 735 F.3d at 163.  
 125. Cosey, 735 F.3d at 163. 
 126. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 6. See also Glenn, 554 U.S. at 108 (discussing the discretionary 
authority of insurance companies in determining valid claims). 
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pain based disability.127 What Cosey holds, according to Judge Davis, “is 
that for chronic pain type claims, objective evidence is not a sine qua non” 
of a disability finding.128 In Judge Davis’ view, this holding could be “very 
significant” for individuals with chronic pain.129 
 
3.      Administrative adjudication and appeals 
 
A majority of pain related claims are heard in administrative 
settings.130 These include state administrative proceedings that adjudicate 
workers’ compensation cases and federal administrative settings that 
adjudicate SSDI disability claims.131 In these administrative proceedings, 
Professor Greely noted that the context of proof is sharply different: “the 
rules of evidence are slacker, and in some cases close to non-existent, and 
there is no jury, and there are no instructions.”132 Compared to federal and 
state courts, there often may not be “the same level of written opinions and 
precedent—it varies from system to system, but it’s a very different kind of 
world.”133 These cases can eventually proceed on appeal into a state or 
federal court where state or federal judges (without the aid of a jury) may 
review the determination made by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”).134 
This standard of review is less deferential than in ERISA cases, and judges 
frequently may comb the record to evaluate independently whether the 
denied claim appears meritorious.135 
The role of the ALJ as an ultimate decision maker in administrative 
courts and in state and federal review of ERISA and administrative claims 
means that these ALJs are vested with tremendous authority relative to 
 
 127. Cosey, 735 F.3d at 164 (discussing how the insurer concluded there was a lack of medical 
evidence to conclude that Cosey had a disability). 
 128. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 6; see also Cosey, 735 F.3d at 163 (holding that objective proof 
is not necessary for a disability claim). 
 129. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 6. 
 130. See, e.g., EMP. BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN., FAQs About The Benefit Claims Procedure 
Regulation, U.S. DEP’T LAB., http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq_claims_proc_reg.html (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2015) (discussing how ERISA claims must first go through administrative 
process).  
 131. Id. 
 132. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 8. 
 133. Id. 
 134. For example, in Maryland, an unsatisfied party may request that “any question of fact 
involved in the case” be submitted to a jury, which essentially affords claimants (and employers) 
an opportunity to retry the case in front of a jury. MD. LAB. & EMPL. CODE ANN. § 9-745(d) 
(2014). There is also a more traditional review option, where the Circuit Court merely examines 
the Commission’s decision in light of the facts already gathered. § 9-745(c). 
 135. See § 9-745 (noting the different standards of review as compared to ERISA cases). 
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claims involving chronic pain.136 The ways in which these ALJs review and 
evaluate the parties’ evidence is not bounded by Daubert (as it would be in 
the trial context), which proves that ALJs are the crucial decision makers in 
interpreting and applying the law relative to evidence of chronic pain.137 
Their understandings and beliefs about what kinds of chronic pain claims 
seem credible and what types of evidence tend to substantiate a claim of 
chronic pain may be the most important across the three types of cases that 
Professor Greely described, and across all of the legal contexts in which 
those types of cases may arise.  
 
V.      COULD PAIN NEUROIMAGING EVIDENCE BE USED IN COURT? 
 
Aside from pain neuroimaging studies informing legal systems 
through aggregate findings, there is also the potential for the fMRI to 
“decode” a person’s experience.138 In an ideal materialization of this 
decoding for pain, a person would simply go into a scanner and the readout 
would tell you if she were experiencing pain.139 While the technology 
might not be available today, there was general agreement that it could 
arrive in the foreseeable future for decoding acute pain, and eventually it 
could possibly be able to decode chronic pain.140 There are several 
limitations to this approach that will need to be addressed. Professor Davis 
pointed out some of these limitations, and Professor Greely shared his 
views on the nature of those limitations in a legal setting.141 
A particular problem in decoding a person’s brain activity to see if s/he 
is in pain is known as the “reverse inference” problem.142 Professor Davis 
described the problem through an example: 
 
 136. See e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 109 (2008) (noting the role of the 
administrative law judge in determining issues of fact in ERISA claims); Papendick v. Sullivan, 
969 F.2d 298, 701 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that the court’s role is to only review the administrative 
law judge’s decision for substantial evidence, which may be less than a preponderance of 
evidence). 
 137. Compare Sullivan, 969 F.2d at 701 (stating that the role of the court is to review the 
administrative law judge’s decision for substantial evidence), with Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (discussing how even though the judge plays the role of 
“gatekeeper,” the jury is charged with determining the validity of scientific evidence). 
 138. See Stephen M. LaConte, Decoding fMRI Brain States in Real-Time, 56 NEUROIMAGE 
440, 440 (2011) (stating that fMRI data can be used to decode brain states). 
 139. See Panel 1, supra note 1, at 23 (discussing how it would be easier to determine pain if a 
scanner simply revealed whether a person was actually experiencing it). 
 140. Id. at 4, 11. 
 141. Id. at 23. 
 142. See NICHOLAS MACKINTOSH ET AL., THE ROYAL SOC’Y, BRAIN WAVES MODULE 4: 
NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW 6 (2011) (discussing the reverse inference problem in determining 
the meaning of signals through existing imaging technology in the brain). 
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if you deliver a painful stimulus, or if people are in pain, 
you can definitely see certain kinds of signatures—pain 
signatures—in the brain. But there are other things you 
could do, [such as to] have somebody think about 
something very salient, or all sorts of other things, that 
actually will give you the exact same brain map, the same 
response. The same areas of the brain are going to respond, 
because the pain system shares resources—real estate—
with many of these other cognitive and emotional 
systems.143  
 
The essence of the reverse inference problem is that you cannot infer a 
specific behavior just by looking at a brain pattern.144 An example of the 
reverse inference problem is illustrated with spinal malformations and low 
back pain. Often, spine imaging is used when a person complains of back 
pain.145 In a case where a herniated disc, degenerative disc, or other 
anomaly is identified, it is easy to assume that the pain is associated with 
that anomaly. It turns out, however, that these same spinal anomalies are 
very common in healthy, asymptomatic people.146 The imaging finding in 
that case could be spurious and it should not guide the intervention 
approach.  
Professor Davis warned that even in the future, when machine learning 
and similar technologies might be able to provide predictions of whether 
someone is in pain, even with all of the proper controls and 
countermeasures and with high (e.g., over 95 percent) accuracy and 
specificity, there is still uncertainty; what will happen to those 5 percent of 
 
 143. See id. (discussing how reactions from one part of the brain does not necessarily 
coordinate with any single particular emotion, feeling, or act). 
 144. Id. There are a few notable exceptions to this reverse inference problem, such as a paper 
by Jack Gallant and colleagues describing a method to decode visual scenes from brain activity 
recorded with fMRI. Jack Gallant et al., Encoding and Decoding in fMRI, 56 NEUROIMAGE 400, 
407 (2011) (discussing how the fMRI can decode brain activity). 
 145. See Pradeep Suri et al., Longitudinal Associations Between Incident Lumbar Spine MRI 
Findings and Chronic Low Back Pain or Radicular Symptoms: Retrospective Analysis of Data 
from the Longitudinal Assessment of iImaging and Disability of the Back (LAIDBACK), BMC 
MUSCULOSKELETAL DISORDERS 2 (May 13, 2014), http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-
2474/15/152 (discussing how MRI technology is ineffective in discerning pain caused by lower 
back problems and spinal malformations). 
 146. Id. 
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people for whom the tests fail?147 As Professor Greely notes, “the law 
would like to have 100 percent certain evidence, but it rarely does.”148 
To Professor Greely, the concern about reverse inference was less 
imperative. He suggested that there simply would need to be some 
acknowledgement that the test was good even if it was not perfect.149 If it 
could be accurate 85–95 percent of the time, it would still be useful in 
providing some objective evidence, which, along with the other evidence, 
could strengthen (or weaken) a case. In the end, Professor Greely suggested 
that, in this domain as in all others, it will be the judge’s role to sort out 
whether the evidence is strong enough.150 By analogy, Professor Greely 
described a case where an eyewitness account is admitted in court as 
evidence, even though the accuracy of such witnesses is far less than 
perfect.151 In addition to the evidence itself, there is a matter of convincing 
a judge or jury that the quality of the evidence is generally sufficiently 
reliable to influence a final decision.152 Professor Greely noted that 
explaining to a jury how to use neuroimaging evidence would be an 
additional potential challenge.153 Yet, despite those challenges, Professor 
Greely states that having a test that provides objective evidence in the 
majority of cases would be beneficial to society, as more cases would be 
decided correctly and more cases would settle, leaving fewer cases 
requiring an expensive court process.154 That is, even if the accuracy of the 
test and difficulty in their interpretation pose potential additional obstacles, 
then as long as they improve the quality of the evidence, their value in 
providing some form of objective evidence in a case that can only otherwise 





 147. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 25. 
 148. Id. at 23. 
 149. Id. at 25 (discussing how testing may be only 95 percent accurate, but the degree of 
accuracy will force settlements, which he contends is a good thing). 
 150. Id. at 23. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See The Criminal Justice Systems: A Guide for Law Enforcement Officers and Expert 
Witnesses in Impaired Driving Cases, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, 
http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/enforce/GuideforOfficers/pages/Glossary.html (last visited 
Mar. 11, 2015) (describing that a judge, under the Daubert test, must determine if the evidence is 
“relevant” and “reliable”).  
 153. See Panel 1, supra note 1, at 21 (questioning whether somebody at trial can say, based on 
neuroimaging, that this person is in pain or that this person is not in pain).  
 154. Id. at 24–25. 
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VI.      LIMITATIONS, CAUTIONARY LESSONS FROM OTHER SCIENCE-LAW 
INTERACTIONS, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
A.     A Call for Better Technology to Decode Brain Activity? 
 
The panelists disagreed on whether incremental improvements to 
existing neuroimaging protocols will result in reliable evidence of pain in 
an individual, or whether it will be necessary to develop new protocols and 
technologies.155 According to Professor Davis, we need new technology, 
not just a better version of what we have: “We can’t just get incrementally 
better. We need a different approach, and so I’m hoping that something is 
on the horizon.”156 She pointed to recent advances in the area of 
optogenetics as one potential future development—it is not yet available for 
humans, but it is making rapid progress with likely applications in human 
research in the not-so-distant future.157  
From many neuroimaging studies on evoked pain in healthy subjects, 
we now have a firm understanding of the neural circuits involved in acute 
pain.158 Professor Davis pointed out that the most difficult cases for the law 
to deal with will be those with claims of chronic pain conditions in which 
spontaneous or ongoing pain is prevalent.159 Relatively few neuroimaging 
studies have examined ongoing pain,160 and it is not yet clear whether this 
type of imaging paradigm would be able to distinguish someone with 
chronic pain from a healthy, pain free person. As Professor Davis stated: 
 
 
 155. Compare id. at 12–13 (indicating that Prof. Davis described how we need all new 
technology rather than getting incrementally better with neuroimaging), with id. at 3–4 (reporting 
that David Seminowicz described the advances made in neuroimaging research and how chronic 
pain can now be identified). 
 156. Id. at 13. 
 157. Id. at 13. See generally Travis May et. al., Detection of Optogenetic Stimulation in 
Somatosensory Cortex by Non-Human Primates - Towards Artificial Tactile Sensation, PLOS ONE 
(Dec. 26, 2014), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0114529 
(describing the use of optogenetics on non-human primates). 
 158. Emma G. Duerden & Marie-Claire Albanese, Localization of Pain-Related Brain 
Activation: A Meta-Analysis of Neuroimaging Data, 34 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 109, 109–11 
(2013). 
 159. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 23. 
 160. See, e.g., Matthew A. Howard et. al., Beyond Patient Reported Pain: Perfusion Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging Demonstrates Reproducible Cerebral Representation of Ongoing Post-
Surgical Pain, PLOS ONE (Feb. 23, 2011), 
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0017096 (explaining that there 
are relatively few neuroimaging reports describing the cerebral representation of ongoing pain, 
and fewer still describe clinical ongoing pain). 
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This has been the reason why using imaging to look at 
chronic pain, instead of acute pain, which you can evoke, is 
really, really hard. To determine if somebody is in chronic 
pain, you want to put somebody in a scanner or do some 
sort of test and not do anything to them, just look, and say, 
“is that brain firing on its own, abnormally?”161 
 
B.      Pictures in the Courtroom 
 
Judge Davis added a cautionary note on the use of technology in the 
courtroom:  
 
Courts [and] judges have a real concern about imaging 
because of the potential of the misuse of pretty pictures. 
And the cautionary note that [Professor Davis] struck will 
not be struck by those with skin in the game, as [Professor 
Greely] [previously] mentioned very astutely. There will be 
those, as there already are those out there, ready to push the 
technology way beyond the limits of legitimacy. And 
courts are very worried about that.162  
 
He recalled when PowerPoint slides were used for the first time in 
courtrooms:  
 
it was very controversial. It was very controversial, 
because . . . better moneyed, better financed, perhaps better 
lawyers, were ahead of the game, and were able, in various 
kinds of cases, to bring pretty pictures and great graphics 
and great texts on this new phenomenon, and there were 
some on the other side [saying], “Judge, that’s not fair! The 
jury’s going to be overwhelmed by the pretty pictures” . . . . 
And, so we worked that out, and so the price came down, 
and the word went out, and so everybody uses PowerPoint 
now in the courtroom, but that’s the kind of concern, one of 
the concerns, about too early [and] too untested kinds of 
imaging that, if I were a plaintiff’s lawyer, I certainly 
 
 161. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 23. 
 162. Id. at 13. 
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would try to get pretty pictures of brains in pain before the 
jury. And courts will have to guard against that.163 
 
C.      Examples of Other Scientific Evidence in the Legal System 
 
Looking to other examples of the introduction of scientific evidence in 
the courtroom, there was concern about the poor quality of the forensic 
sciences along with suggestions that we need to take an approach similar to 
what was done with the introduction of DNA evidence: establishing a 
robust research culture around that evidence.164 From the audience, Judge 
Nancy Gertner pointed out other areas where law has depended on science, 
including:  
 
forensic science, ballistics, eyewitnesses, [etc.] . . . [experts 
have been] trying to come up with standards in advance 
[and] to inform what courts do, because otherwise this is 
going to be a patchwork quilt. [An ALJ] is in a different 
situation because [they are] the decision maker, and [they] 
have to write something with respect to this. And so, 
arguably, Social Security Disability claims will be where 
there is some development of the standards, as opposed to 
the jury box, which is a black hole. . . . . But, again, we’re 
dealing with a new world and old standards. . . . One thing 
that we ought to think about is what kind of standards to do 
in advance—to create a gold standard, not have it percolate 
through the courts, because it’s not going to percolate 
through the courts. You want to have it in advance by 
lawyers, scientists, judges, panels, or whatever, to percolate 
the gold standard, not the courts.165 
 
Professor Davis disagreed with this point, suggesting that it should be 
the neuroscientists who set up the way to determine the gold standard or at 
least the criteria for how to achieve such a goal, which applies not only to 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 26; see also Advancing Justice Through DNA Technology: Using DNA to Solve 
Crimes, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/ag/advancing-justice-through-dna-
technology-using-dna-solve-crimes (last updated Sept. 9, 2014) (describing how DNA research is 
understood and relied upon as evidence in the courtroom). 
 165. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 13. 
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chronic pain, but also to other areas of neuroimaging research that involve 
“mind reading.”166 She was concerned that 
 
the brain imaging community has not been overly 
responsive to get onboard with this . . . . People are, for 
whatever reason, either not interested or worried about 
getting involved or not feeling that it’s their responsibility. 
I’ve been trying to figure out whose responsibility it is. Is it 
the American Medical Association? Is it the brain imagers? 
Is it the pain community? Is it governments? Whose 
responsibility is it to set up the gold standard for medical 
tests? And, so, I’m hoping that this meeting today will 
actually help promote that and move that forward, because 
there are small group of folks that do want to do this, and 
we’re just kind of stuck in terms of not quite knowing what 
channels to go through politically and medically.167 
 
Professor Greely added his thoughts on the need to have a systematic 
research program in place in order to get scientific evidence to a point 
where it is useful in court. He stated that  
 
DNA is a nice example, [which involved] two national 
academy reports to sort of set the population science side of 
it, and then [the] FBI sponsored laboratory accreditation to 
get the standards and procedures down. I think those two 
things—having good science and having good standardized 
procedures—are really helpful in any of this stuff.168 
 
Judge Gertner made the comment that much of the discussion on the 
panel sounded like “a classic lawyer-scientist conversation. Scientists are 
asking for a gold standard, and the law is talking process.”169 She then 
asked how this lack of a gold standard in pain cases differs from other types 
of gold standards (namely with mental disorders).170 
 
 166. Id. at 26. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 25. 
 170. Id.  
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Professor Greely commented that while he thought the issues were 
similar in some ways, pain is likely a more common matter in the legal 
system. He stated that 
 
Neuroimaging can contribute something to some kinds of 
mental—or things that look like mental—problems, like 
orbital frontal dementia will show up pretty strongly on a 
neuroimaging scan [and] there are some neuroimaging 
indications that can be consistent or inconsistent with 
Alzheimer’s [although] that’s neurological rather than 
mental.171  
 
It was unclear whether the distinction between “mental” and 
“neurological” made any difference in court, and Professor Greely 
suggested that could be the topic of a future conference.172 From the 
audience, Deborah Runkle from the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science (“AAAS”) added that “[t]hey say the diseases are 
called mental until you can find the physical causes, in which case they 
shift over and become neurological.”173  
 
D.      Standards of Pain Measurement and the Need for Objective 
Measures in the Law 
 
While many points were raised and discussed in this panel, it was clear 
that several issues would not be easily resolved. The panelists described a 
disconnect between the way pain is viewed in clinical and research settings 
compared to the courts, and the way neuroimaging data could be used and 
misused in the legal system.174 Currently, the gold standard for pain 
measurement is self reporting,175 where on a 10 point numerical rating 
scale, 0 is no pain and 10 is the worst pain imaginable.176 In clinical trials 
 
 171. Id. at 18. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id.  
 174. See, e.g., id. at 3 (describing the complexity in the way pain is viewed in neurological 
studies). 
 175. See Panel 2, supra note 20, at 15 (discussing moving the gold standard away from 
diagnostic testing). 
 176. See M. Gabrielle Page et al., Validation of the Numerical Rating Scale for Pain Intensity 
and Unpleasantness in Pediatric Acute Postoperative Pain: Sensitivity to Change Over Time, 13 J. 
PAIN 359, 359 (2012) (describing how pain is evaluated using a numerical rating scale). 
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on chronic pain (excluding headache/migraine trials), the numerical rating 
scale continues to be the gold standard.177  
Professor Davis pointed out that—at least in the medical world—only 
a very small minority (small enough to be considered negligible) of chronic 
pain patients are malingerers or fakers.178 In fact, it would be highly 
unlikely that a group of patients with a given diagnosis would all fake the 
same pattern of symptoms and somehow fake their brain patterns in a 
common way.179 The point that Professor Davis touched upon here was that 
researchers have been trying to establish “pain signatures” or “biomarkers” 
for chronic pain disorders.180 Such signatures could be in the form of 
functional patterns of pain related activity, functional connectivity patterns 
at rest, or structural anatomical patterns.181 While this area of research is 
still in its infancy and requires considerable replication and additional 
proofs, it points to the potential for signatures of disease to become a reality 
in the near future. A neuroimaging based signature or biomarker could be 
used for diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment outcome prediction. Even in the 
absence of such an objective biomarker in the medical setting, clinicians 
will generally take a patient’s claim of pain at face value.182 
While self reporting might be fine for clinical and research purposes, it 
might simply be not enough in the legal system. Professor Greely argued 
that despite the limitations of pain neuroimaging, the need for objective 
evidence in the legal system outweighs them.183 He said that there must be 
some additional evidence to back self reporting in order to determine if 
claimants are exaggerating the pain or if they are lying about it: 
 
 177. Id. 
 178. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 16. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 22. See, e.g., Irene Tracey & Patrick W. Mantyh, The Cerebral Signature for Pain 
Perception and Its Modulation, 55 NEURON REV. 377, 377 (2007) (discussing the latest data 
regarding the cerebral signature of pain and its modulation in humans); Tor D. Wager et al., An 
fMRI-Based Neurologic Signature of Physical Pain, 368 N. ENG. J. MED. 1388, 1388 (2013) 
(describing two different studies that used machine-learning analyses to identify neurological pain 
signatures); Marwan Baliki et al., Brain Morphological Signatures for Chronic Pain, PLOS ONE 
(Oct. 13, 2011), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0026010 
(illustrating several studies that have tried to establish various neurological pain signatures for 
chronic pain disorders). 
 181. See Michael E. Robinson, Pain Measurement and Brain Activity: Will Neuroimages 
Replace Pain Ratings?, 14 J. PAIN, 323, 325 (2013) (describing the various forms that a pain 
related signature could take).  
 182. See, e.g., Boadie W. Dunlop & Helen S. Mayberg, Neuroimaging-Based Biomarkers for 
Treatment Selection in Major Depressive Disorder, 16 DIALOGUES CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 
479, 479–80 (2012) (describing the use of neuroimaging based signatures for treatment outcome 
predictions in patients suffering from depression disorder). 
 183. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 10. 
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“[determining] [w]hat that evidence is is often going to be really tough, but 
I think that, along with that question of value in the pain and suffering, 
[those] are the two big problems the legal system has in dealing with 
pain.”184 Professor Greely further noted that “[w]e can’t just accept 
people’s self assessments. . . . if we did, we’d have a country which was 
entirely on disability payments, because getting paid to do nothing is, for 
some people, at least for many people, better than getting paid to work.”185 
Thus, pain remains a challenge for the legal system as it is hard to quantify, 
verify, or deny; with little precedent to set standards for dealing with pain, 
each case will follow its own course and rely on different types of evidence. 
 
VII.      CONCLUSION 
 
While there is not yet—and perhaps might never be—an objective 
measurement of pain, the panel agreed that pain neuroimaging could 
provide useful information for the legal system in the form of aggregated 
data from healthy people and chronic pain patients. Additionally, pain 
neuroimaging could provide this kind of information possibly in the near 
future through a pain measurement neuroimaging test using existing or new 
technology. The panel, however, pointed out several reasons to proceed 
with caution.186 These reasons included limitations of the neuroimaging 
technology and the need for systematic research in a way that is comparable 
to the development of DNA testing, as well as the need for limitations of 
the judge and jury in assessing neuroimaging evidence.187  
 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See, e.g., id. at 13 (describing the limitations of neurological imaging and potential issues 
with using neurological imaging in court). 
 187. See id. at 26 (discussing the importance of having standardized procedures for evaluating 
scientific evidence such as DNA). 
